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The fire of the gynecocracy debate, ignited by the events of the late 1550s, continued to burn unabated even after the passing of the three "mischievous Marys" whose exercise of political authority had so troubled John Knox: Mary Tudor died in 1558, Marie of Guise in 1560, and Mary Stuart, executed in 1587. The heat and intensity of the argument were the result of the immediate political moment. But beyond its vehemence and currency, what is most striking now is how little the arguments of the participants reflected in any significant way the intellectual and political ferment of the early modern period beyond the particular set of historical circumstances that sparked the debate. While it is commonplace among modern historians to assert, like Paula Scalingi, that in the late sixteenth century "the question of female sovereignty emerged as part of a much broader controversy over the proper role of women in society," a careful analysis of the arguments made by participants on both sides of the gynecocracy debate seems to reveal just how little they drew on emerging ideas and new methods of intellectual inquiry as they constructed their arguments.
2 As we have seen in our discussion of the debate, those who engaged themselves so vehemently in the argument relied largely on the medieval Scholastic tradition of argument in their works: to make their case, they appealed to the authority of Aristotle, to the authority of Roman law, to the authority of Genesis and the New Testament epistles, and to the authority of the church fathers. Those who defended gynecocracy might appeal to Plato, might include classical as well as Christian authorities, and might even incorporate a few historical and linguistic arguments, but they never changed the terms of the debate or moved beyond the limits set by Knox. As they cited, glossed, interpreted, and reinterpreted identical passages drawn from identical sources, the treatises for and against female rule can be read as one long illustration of the dialectic method, a kind of sixteenth-century Sic et non.
In their critique of Scholasticism, humanist thinkers undertook a reexamination of the authors, texts, and methods of inquiry inherited from the classical and medieval past. As one part of this critical reassessment, humanist scholars reconsidered woman's nature and her potential, challenging the conclusions of old authorities by considering new evidence.
3 This early modern discussion of women emerged from the so-called querelle des femmes, a literary debate initiated by Christine de Pizan in the early fifteenth century. 4 The debate raised and answered a number of probing questions: What are women, really? Do they possess immortal souls? Are they moreor, perhaps, less-responsible than Adam for the Fall? Are women capable of virtue as well as vice? (That they are full of vice seems to be assumed.) If women can be virtuous, are there virtues that are particular to them, as women, or are women capable of the same virtues as men? Are women capable of moral judgment? Of intellectual achievement? Of noble action in the public sphere? Just what is her proper role in society? How do we properly define the relationship between woman and man? And, strictly speaking, are women even human?
5 As only one small part of the larger humanist project, scholars turned to an examination of real women and to an exploration of the reality of their lives.
